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calling for the interconnection between law and morality because he
does not want to be pushed into Fuller's camp. Like Dworkin, Pro-
fessor Bodenheimer seems to be an uneasy positivist. He leans toward
the idea of law-morality but refuses to embrace it head-on. Yet his
students and his readers may take the plunge. There is, these days,
a great revival of interest in moral philosophy, and the best works
build upon the advances to linguistic precision that logical, positivism
has fostered. Ironically, that very precision now seems to be under-
mining positivism itself, much as Wittgenstein foresaw in his Philosoph-
ical Investigations (1953).20 In this context, Power, Law, and Society
may be seen as an important bridge between the older style of positiv-
ism and the new concern for morality. The humanistic, wide-ranging
examples brought forth by the author attest to the morality that Fuller
argues cannot be separated from law.
ANTHONY D'AMATO*
JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW. By Joseph W.
Bishop, Jr.' New York: Charterhouse Books, Inc., 1974. Pp. xvi,
315. $8.95.
If there is a lack of scholarly treatises on military law, there is none
of popular polemics on the subject.
J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE xii (1974)
[C]ourts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with
the nice subtleties of constitutional law.. . . [A] military trial is
marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice.
O'CALLAHAN V. PARKER, 395 U.S. 258,
265-66 (1969) (DOUGLAS, J.)
If, as widely believed, experience is the best teacher, certainly Justice
William Douglas offers unimpeachable credentials in the pure art and
high science of the detection of legal systems which are "singularly
inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law." His
1. Professor of Law, Yale University.
20. See H. PrnITN, WITGrENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 50-70 (1972).
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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recorded opinions over the past thirty-plus years disclose that he has
discovered just such ineptness, with a fine impartiality, in virtually all
of the fifty states, the federal district and circuit courts, and even among
his colleagues on the Supreme Court itself. Although it is not always
clear in matters of opinion who leads and who follows, there can be no
doubt that this unwavering consistency, coupled with the prestige of
his record-breaking tenure in office, have made Justice Douglas the
most brilliant luminary in a constellation of critics bitterly hostile to
existing practices and procedures in the administration of criminal jus-
tice in this country. And nowhere has this antagonism shown itself
with more passionate intensity than in the recent assault on the institu-
tions of military law.
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., professor of law at Yale University, under-
takes in Justice Under Fire: A Study of Military Law to enter this
emotional maelstrom on a vehicle of outraged objectivity. With pains-
taking accuracy and commendable brevity, he offers the concerned
reader an authentic insight into the practices, problems, vices, and
virtues of the American military establishment in its law-related ac-
tivities.
[M]ilitary law, like other fields of law, raises serious problems that are
more likely to -be solved intelligently if politicians and voters have a
better knowledge of the facts than they are likely to get from such
sources as The New York Review of Books.
J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE XIV (1974)
The legal problems besetting the military in its internal aspect prove
to be generically no different from those present in any system of crim-
inal justice: creation of courts, delineation of jurisdictional boundaries,
description of prohibited conduct, selection of court personnel (judge,
counsel, and trier of fact), rules of procedure, rules of evidence, pre-
scription of penalties, appellate review, and (often most crucial of all)
insulation of the system from improper pressures (from inside and out-
side, from above and below). Since the resolution of these problems
has been the task of American lawyers, rather than soldiers, it is hardly
surprising that the end product is not wholly alien to "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice," and that, as the author points
out, there is less difference between American civilian and military law
than between the Anglo-American system and other systems of justice




there certainly are, and differences there must be, as the Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed:
This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also rec-
ognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and
traditions of its own during its long history. The differences between
the military and civilian communities result from -the fact that "it is
the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight
wars should the occasion arise."
PARKER V. LEVY, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 2555-56
(1974) (REINQUIST, J.)2
In his conclusion, Professor Bishop offers specific suggestions de-
signed to strengthen the position of justice in the military:
1. Creation of permanent military courts, with three- and five-judge
panels to replace line officers as triers of fact in all cases.'
2. Making mandatory the current practice (already nearly univer-
sal) of providing qualified lawyer-counsel for all trials; and creation of
separate divisions of the Judge Advocate General's Office to which both
prosecution and defense counsel are severally and solely responsible.
3. Abolition of the bad conduct discharge, leaving the dishonor-
able discharge as the sole means of punitive elimination from service.
The supposed distinction between them is, at present, wholly illusory.
4. Repeal of the General Articles, which proscribe without specifi-
cation conduct "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman"4 and "preju-
dic[iall of good order and discipline" or calculated "to being discredit
upon the armed forces. '  These should be replaced by provisions
2. Quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). See also Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 (1953); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953); In re Grimley, 137
U.S. 147 (1890).
3. In practice today, about 75% of all courts-martial employ the military judge as
trier of fact. This is the result of defense counsels' option to dispense with the tradi-
tional line-officer panel. See H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MiLrrITARY 533 (1972).
4. Article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 933
(1970), provides:
Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of con-
duct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-mar-
tial may direct.
5. Article 134 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970), provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses
not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be
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specifically denouncing acts which are forbidden to members of the
military.0
5. Abolition of military jurisdiction over all reservists who are not
on active duty.7
6. Repeal of the article denouncing the use by commissioned of-
ficers of contemptuous words against the President and various high
officials." The 1967 conviction of an Army lieutenant under this ar-
ticle9 was its first application in twenty-five years, and the last to date.
7. Making appealable by writ of certiorari all decisions of the high-
est military appellate tribunal, the Court of Military Appeals. 10
These proposals, most of which have been urged by responsible and
sympathetic critics of the military justice system,1 are clearly feasible
and would go far toward eliminating even that "appearance of evil" on
which hinges so much of what substance there is in the emotional out-
pourings of the system's uncompromising opposition.
Beyond the field of military criminal law, Professor Bishop deals in
taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according
to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discre-
tion of that court.
6. The General Articles in their present form were upheld in Parker v. Levy, 94
S. Ct. 2547 (1974). In rejecting the claim that the General Articles are unconstitution-
ally vague, the Court relied principally on the clarification and limitations of the articles
contained in decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, e.g., United States v. Howe,
17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967), and in guidelines supplied under executive
order, see MANUAL FOR CouRTs-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 213c (rev. ed. 1969). 94
S. Ct. at 2560. See generally Wiener, Are the General Military Articles Unconstitution-
ally Vague?, 54 A.B.A.J. 357 (1968).
7. Although the subject is not free of doubt, in Army and Air Force practice there
has been virtually no effort to assert such jurisdiction in the absence of very special cir-
cumstances. The Navy has taken a somewhat broader view. For discussion, see H.
MoYER, supra note 3, at 73-76.
8. UCMJ art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1970). See generally Sherman, The Military
Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 325 (1971).
9. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
10. See Ex parte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). See also ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS 20-21 (1970) (recommen-
dations of Maj. Gen. Kenneth Hodson, formerly Judge Advocate General of the Army).
11. See, e.g., Hodson, Perspective: The Manual for Courts-Martial-1984, 57 MIL.
L. REv. 1 (1972); Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REv. 3
(1970); Sherman, Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military Law, 10 AM. CruM.
L. REv. 25 (1971); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 181
(1962); Note, The Discredit Clause of the UCMJ: An Unrestricted Anachronism, 18




separate chapters with current issues of national war powers, 12 martial
rule in domestic territory,' 3 and the enforcement of the international
laws of war.' He does not conceal his impatience with the eternal
children of the Left, whose militant unconcern with hard facts he finds
matched only by their strident self-righteousness in denouncing their
country for its involvement in "imperialist wars of aggression."'15 But,
despite yielding to the temptation to throw an occasional dart, Professor
Bishop succeeds in presenting an excellent, if necessarily summary,
overview of the complex and controversial questions that inhabit the
borderlands of those mutually exclusive and often belligerent realms
of law, policy, and morals.
Inevitably, he finds in the doctrine of "apparent necessity" an ex-
planation both of executive (and military) jurisdictional demands and
of the Supreme Court's acquiescence in such demands in time of "clear
and present danger" to the national security. This pliancy stands in
sharp contrast to the ringing libertarianism which emerges as each suc-
cessive threat recedes. Indeed, it may very well be that the enduring
strength of our democracy lies precisely in this inconstancy of judicial
opinion, in the ebb and flow of constitutional ideology, in the assur-
ance of the possibility that today's minority will write tomorrow's ma-
jority opinion. Great dangers demand great responses, and the necessity
for such responses has thus far produced our greatest leaders. But
national support for emergency measures has mercifully given birth to
no fuehrer-prinzip here. The policies of Jefferson could not ultimately
sustain the conviction of Colonel Burr;' 6 nor those of Lincoln the mili-
tary conviction of the civilian Milligan;'1 nor those of Roosevelt the
detention of loyal Japanese-American Mrs. Endo;18 nor those of Tru-
man the seizure of crucial, strike-bound, but privately owned steel
mills.19 But in each case, the final decision was reached when the
12. J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDy OF MILrTARY LAW 175 (1974).
13. Id. at 225.
14. Id. at 257.
15. The phrase "wicked, cruel and unnecessary war," so regularly found in these de-
nunciations, seems to have been borrowed from the Civil War speeches of Indiana's pro-
slavery, anti-Lincoln, anti-union activists, Vallandingham and Milligan. See Ex parte
Vallandingham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863); THE MILLIGAN CASE 14, 379-80, 385
(S. Klaus ed. 1970).
16. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
17. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
18. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
19. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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emergency that spawned the questioned policies was safely past; or the
threat to the nation was no longer acute; or the necessity was not, or
was no longer, apparent to the Court, and a more congenial libertari-
anism reasserted itself.
Force, to meet force, arms itself with the inventions of art and science.
It is accompanied 'by insignificant restrictions, hardly worth mention-
ing, which it imposes on itself under the name of international law and
usage, but which do not really weaken its power.
C. VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 3
(0. Jolles transl. 1943)
While "apparent necessity" is a dependable and often wise adviser
in the quiet chambers of the Supreme Court, it can become a bloody
tyrant during military battle. The endless carnage of today's extended
battlefield and the limitless destruction of life and property, as nations
pursue political goals frequently obscure and remote from the personal
concerns of their populations, produce, as they should, an immense
revulsion in souls sensitive to the unhappy lot of man. The war it-
self--or rather, our involvement in the war-and not the cause of the
war, becomes the object of execration for those who would end war
while leaving the causes of war intact. And since our conduct of the
war is the criminal act, this narrow and one-sided morality would damn
without hearing every action and person involved, with the sole pre-
condition that the defendant be either an American or a supporter and
ally of Americans.
But the luxury of this simplistic view is neither available nor help-
ful in the resolution of practical issues surrounding the actual conduct
of hostilities. Here the aim is not 'the abolition of war (by ending our
half of the conflict), but the more realistic goal of mitigating war's
inevitable suffering. And it is not enough to await the advent of some
implausibly impartial International War Crimes Tribunal. Analyzing
the Nuremberg precedent, Professor Bishop finds it virtually sui gen-
eris-a fortuitous concomitance of the triumph of the righteous cause
(though not without its criminal acts and agents) over monstrous and
undisguised criminality (though not without its heroes and victims).
Victor's justice, yes-but, on the whole, justice nonetheless.
The duty of the law today is less dramatic but no less clear. As
Bishop puts it, "Tlhe most realistic prospect for punishing war crimi-
nals is by trial -in the courts of the accused's own country."20  Al-




though 117 Americans were tried by courts-martial, and sixty convicted
of murdering civilians in Vietnam, the proceedings against the My Lai
defendants, and particularly the conviction of William Calley, stand as
the one public monument to the law's limited ideal.
The record is thus very far from perfect. All that can be said is
that it is a better record than that of any other nation in the world
and that it lends a degree of credibility to the Pentagon's numerous or-
ders and regulations that aim to prevent and punish war crimes by
requiring a report and an investigation of such incidents, and the train-
ing and indoctrination of the troops on the subject ...
The fuzzy notion that every citizen of the United States (except the
saints and martyrs of the antiwar movement) is guilty of the war crime
at My Lai-that the unfortunate Lieutenant Calley was merely a scape-
goat-is, to a lawyer, nonsense, and pernicious nonsense at that.
The international law of war, as it now exists, is undoubtedly very
imperfect. . . . All that can be said is that it is better than no law; I
think it probable that much suffering has been prevented in the last
sixty years by the existence of a body of law which nearly all govern-
ments profess to respect, and which most are reluctant to violate openly
and on a large scale.
J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE 292-93 (1974)
Few undertakings are more challenging than the task of presenting
to a professional audience a basic introduction to a separate system
within the area of audience expertise. Negotiating the narrow channel
between verbosity and sketchiness requires all the skill of a master
helmsman; and in any case, the passage will be the inevitable occasion
of confused cries of "Too much!," "Too little!," "Wrong way!," and
"Is this trip really necessary?" From the standpoint of this reviewer,
however, Professor Bishop has met the challenge most commendably.
A reading of Justice Under Fire will go far toward providing that "bet-
ter knowledge of the facts" promised in the book's introduction, in this
alternately abused and neglected area of the law. And it is only the
spread of such knowledge that offers the hope of rational progress
toward the elusive goal of equal justice under law-whether the system
in question be military or civilian.
AARON S. CONDON*
* Professor of Law, University of Mississippi.
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